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Abstract 
The relationship between Greenland and the EU can best be understood by exploring the 
development from Danish colonialism to a future independent Greenlandic state. In 1985, 
Greenland became the first territory ever to leave the EEC when it opted for status as an ‘overseas 
country or territory’. The manner in which Greenland had to follow Denmark into the EEC in 1973 
– whereby Greenlanders saw control over their fisheries move from distant Copenhagen to even-
more-distant Brussels – was pivotal for the Greenlandic demands for home rule which succeeded in 
1979 and made the 1985 withdrawal possible. On 25 November 2008, a majority of the people of 
Greenland voted in favour of enhanced home rule – ‘self-government’ – still within formal Danish 
sovereignty. Denmark and Greenland alike are preparing for a future envisioned as involving 
climate change, intensive raw material extraction, new transportation corridors and new claims to 
sovereignty over the Arctic. Greenland uses this imagined future as a way of enhancing its 
subjectivity, not the least when dealing with the EU. This article analyses how the Greenlandic self-
understanding as being on the way to sovereignty – and the tensions involved – structure the 
triangular relationship between the EU, Greenland and Denmark. The article concludes that the 
visions of sovereign equality might, on the one hand, create greater expectations than Greenland 
will immediately be able to live up to – at home and in the EU. On the other hand, the 
representation of the Greenland‒EU relationship as one of sovereign equality – present and future – 
might just be able to provoke the resources necessary to make the dream come true. 
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The place of the EU in Greenlandic sovereignty games 
The tidal wave of decolonization began with giant India immediately after World War II and 
petered out in the 1970s and 1980s as a number of small islands and archipelagos like Dominica, 
Saint Kitts and Nevis, Vanuatu and Micronesia acquired independence. The wave left behind a 
number of very small polities in terms of population size (Baldacchino, 2012). Small size poses 
specific challenges in terms of relying on outside resources – human, financial, natural, industrially 
processed – which make independence particularly daunting (Nielsen, 2000). But the less-than-rosy 
experiences of larger decolonized states possibly also add to the reluctance observed in these small 
polities (Grovogui, 2012). Indeed, not all candidates have chosen the path of independence. On 25 
November 2008, a majority of the people of Greenland voted in favour of enhanced home rule – 
‘self-government’ – still within formal Danish sovereignty. Denmark and Greenland alike are 
preparing for a future envisioned as involving climate change, intensive raw material extraction, 
new transportation corridors and new claims to sovereignty over the Arctic. Greenland uses this 
imagined future as a way of enhancing its subjectivity – not least when dealing with the EU.  
In 1985, Greenland became the first territory ever to leave the EEC when it opted for a status as an 
‘overseas country or territory’. The EU treaty framework holds a special place for such non-
sovereign, overseas islands with ties to an EU member state (Hannibal et al., 2012). Among these, 
Greenland is the one most consistently building up to acquiring its own sovereignty (Adler-Nissen 
and Gad, 2012: 238‒9). The way Greenland had to follow Denmark into the EEC in 1973 – 
whereby Greenlanders saw control over their fisheries move from distant Copenhagen to even-
more-distant Brussels – was pivotal for the Greenlandic demands for home rule, which succeeded in 
1979 and made the 1985 withdrawal possible.  
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This article analyses how the Greenlandic self-image as being on the path to full sovereignty – and 
the tensions involved – structure the triangular relationship between the EU, Greenland and 
Denmark. The article primarily focuses on the Greenlandic perspective – but as this is shaped by the 
mutual relations to Copenhagen and Brussels, the Danish and EU perspectives necessarily come 
into view. The Greenland‒EU relationship can best be understood by exploring the development 
from Danish colonialism to a future independent Greenlandic state: this development involves, first, 
a tension between the development towards self-sustainability in terms of welfare versus the 
preference for deciding for oneself. More specifically, it involves maintaining the cash flow from 
Brussels while returning as few fishing quotas as possible and keeping sovereignty from ‘going 
south’. Second, the development involves tension between two distinct approaches to gain 
recognition and subjectivity on the world scene: on the one hand, protecting certain practices 
deemed central to indigenous Inuit culture – specifically, the killing and consumption of certain 
wild animals – even if Danish sovereignty must be utilized as a lever to achieve this end. On the 
other hand, posing as a polity in charge of its own business – despite the current, formal Danish 
sovereignty.  
The proceeding section tells a story about how Greenland’s experience with sovereignty as a part of 
the Danish empire has shaped national identity discourse – and a history of how the Greenlandic 
relationship to the EU has been intimately interwoven with the Greenlandic developments towards 
independence. Then, a section demonstrates how Denmark is ‘photo-shopped out of the picture’ 
when the – still less-than-sovereign – government of Greenland rhetorically portrays the relations to 
the EU of this Greenland working to leave non-sovereignty behind. By removing Denmark from the 
picture, the Greenlandic government engages in a strategy to build up expectations at home and 
abroad of a Greenland taking care of its own business – a sovereign Greenland. A further section 
zooms in on the practical games necessary to beef up the bureaucratic muscle of a fragile 
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microstate. Greenland’s approach has – pragmatically – been to utilize the Danish EU membership 
as a platform for its relations with the EU. Nevertheless, the tension between development towards 
self-sustainability and self-government must be handled. And so does the tension between 
indigeneity and statehood. The practical handling of the relationship to the EU has relied on an 
intricate relationship with Denmark. During the first decade of the new millennium, however, the 
practical handling of the relationship is substantially ‘Greenlandicized’.  
The article concludes that the visions of sovereign equality might create greater expectations than 
Greenland will immediately be able to live up to – at home and in the EU. On the other hand, as the 
realization of the expectations seems to be conditioned on the expectations being built up, 
Greenlandic nationalism might ultimately be able to drag itself up by its own bootstraps. The 
representation of the Greenland‒EU relationship as one of sovereign equality – present and future – 
might just be able to stimulate the resources necessary to make the dream come true. 
Greenland’s experience with sovereignty  
One can easily tell a history of Greenlandic national identity – including a concept of sovereignty as 
something worth striving for – as a product of the bilateral relationship with Denmark. This is what 
this section begins with. The second task for this section, however, is to re-tell the story with a 
focus on how Danish policies towards Greenland have been structured by concerns about protecting 
its sovereignty in relation to other states – and how Danish sovereignty games involving others 
have, somewhat paradoxically, empowered Greenland on its road to independence; lately not least 
in relation to the EU. 
A postimperial inconvenience to national identities 
When Norwegian vicar Hans Egede embarked for Greenland in 1721, his mission on behalf of the 
Danish king was to re-christen the small group of Norse who had colonized parts of Southern 
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Greenland centuries earlier and take up trade: the Lutheran reformation had never reached the 
Norse, with whom the metropole had lost contact (Gad, 1973: 14). Instead of long-lost brethren, 
however, the missionary found Inuit who had immigrated down the coast from the North. The 
Danes took it upon themselves to baptize the heathens (Gad, 1973: 28‒32). As the empire was 
meant to finance itself (Gad, 1973: 32), The Royal Greenlandic Trade Company was established 
(Gad, 1973: 374‒95; Marquardt, 2006: 156). Over the centuries, the concerns of mission and trade 
clashed and conformed to form the pattern of settlements: the trade initially supported a dispersed, 
nomadic population to harvest the sea for tradables (Gad, 1973: 345‒6), while parts of the mission 
wanted to assemble people to hear the gospel (Gad, 1973: 323, 346). Later, when the demand for 
skin, blubber and tooth declined, the trade saw the merits of concentrating the population to develop 
a fishing industry (Friis, 1999: 176‒7; Sørensen, 2006: 38). 
From the beginning of colonization, identification was straightforward: the Danes made the 
decisions (naalagat), conducted trade, did the teaching and lived in wooden or stone houses, 
whereas the Greenlanders were decided over, did the hunting and lived in tents or turf huts (Seiding 
and Toft, 2011: 273‒6). For a long time, Denmark limited access for other Europeans to protect 
Inuit culture – not so much for the Greenlanders as to secure the supply of tradables provided by the 
traditional hunters (Gad, 1973: 345; Thomsen, 1996: 266). Nevertheless, a group of ‘hybrids’ 
emerged as the result of extra-marital activities and interracial marriages. This hybridity made 
questions of identity acute (Seiding and Toft, 2011): a boy with a Danish father had nobody to teach 
him hunting – but he could take up a ‘Danish’ job in trade (Gad, 1973: 210, 358) or as a catechist in 
one of the settlements along the coast (Gad, 1973: 353). In the same period, German romantic 
nationalism – in a specifically Danish version developed by Lutheran theologian N.F.S. Grundtvig 
– came to Greenland: the true potential of the nation – of any nation – demanded the enlightenment 
of the common man in his own language (Wilhjelm, 1997: 29). As enlightenment came from 
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Denmark, however, interlocutors capable of both Danish and Greenlandic were necessary. The 
hybrid, hence, also found a place in the newly established teacher’s college (Wilhjelm, 1997: 32, 
40, 116). An independent, Greenlandic elite was established (Thuesen, 1988: 63), an elite that 
aspired for equality with the Danes. But even as formal, legal equality was established with the 
incorporation of Greenland in Denmark in 1953 (and along with incorporation: priority to Danish 
language at all levels), the everyday experience was still one of a clear ethnic hierarchy (Larsen, 
1992b: 387; Thomsen, 1996: 271‒2). The result was Greenlandic nationalism (Langgård, 2002: 79) 
– a nationalism which was at the same time formulated against Denmark and formed with a picture 
of the ideal nation state which mirrors the ‘perfect’ coincidence of state, nation, culture and religion 
which (after a series of lost wars) is Denmark’s self-image. 
So when Greenland identifies itself today – i.e. when people living in Greenland talk about what 
Greenland is and should be – diverse elements are articulated: on the one hand, Greenlandic identity 
has to do with cultural roots. The Greenlandic language is pivotal. So is a close relationship to 
nature and a traditional material culture developed for survival in the high north. A series of 
practices involving the killing and consumption of wild animals must therefore be protected, 
practiced along the coast (cf. Neumann, 2002: 110‒5) and promoted abroad.i 
On the other hand, the political debates make clear that modern phenomena such as democracy and 
welfare are equally indispensable elements in what Greenland is and ought to be. As is the nation-
state: no one imagines a Greenland which is not a democratic welfare state (Gad, 2005: 208). In 
Greenlandic identity discourse, the national principle is what ties aboriginality and modernity 
together: Greenland ought to be an independent state to allow Greenlandic culture to flourish within 
a welfare society. Some deem this impossible – some deem it a perspective far removed to the 
horizon – yet others would declare independence soon. So in terms of Greenlandic discourse, the 
present situation is not as it ought to be: Greenland is not an independent nation state. The current 
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Greenlandic identity is transitional – Greenland sees itself on the way from imperial submission to 
future independence. In that sense, becoming independent is part of Greenlandic identity (Gad, 
2005, 2009a). And in that sense, most Greenlandic domestic politics are almost by definition 
postimperial sovereignty games: Linguistic games allowed by the concept of sovereignty, played 
while leaving empire behind. These domestic games serve to ‘hierarchicize’ three priorities: legal 
self-government, economic self-sufficiency and aboriginal cultural identity. Greenland needs to be 
allowed to govern itself and Greenland needs to be able to sustain itself – all the while Greenland 
needs to preserve symbolic elements of Inuit culture as an anchor for its identity.  
Seen from Denmark, the relation to Greenland is also an inconvenience to national identity 
discourse. Denmark and the Danes are wont to see themselves as a cultural nation which built a 
state to nest the unfolding of its inner qualities (cf. Østergaard, 1992: 34‒5, 50; Hansen, 2002: 51‒2, 
60‒1, 69, 80‒5; Gad, 2010: 250). In Denmark-the-nation-state, there is (ideally) no room for 
cultural plurality (Gad, 2010: ch. 6‒8). To have this conception of the nation state co-exist with an 
intimate relationship with a former colony necessitates linguistic and legal games. Particularly, 
Danish discourse requires the concept of ‘Community of the Realm’ [Rigsfællesskab] to make sense 
of the relation (cf. Gad, 2008, 2009b): the ‘Realm’ works as an extension of ‘our state’ – 
necessitated by how the state is intimately tied to ‘our nation’. And as Denmark sees itself as being 
on the side of the weak and equality (Hansen, 2002: 59; Due-Nielsen and Petersen, 2008: 523), this 
Realm cannot be conceived of as a hierarchical relationship (Gad, 2008, 2009b, 2010). Being 
colonizers is at odds with the Danish self-image, so the realm is something we ‘share in common’ 
with the Greenlanders.
ii
 The main element in the Community of the Realm – apart from legal 
submission – is an annual block grant from Denmark to Greenland. This element adds to the Danish 
self-image of being a force for good in the world: Denmark prides itself on being among the very 
best when it comes to providing development aid. In the same way, the annual grants to Greenland 
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serve as proof of maternal benevolence – only in this relation, the colonial past makes conditionality 
impossible: while Denmark may paternalistically demand good governance in sub-Saharan Africa 
(Bach, 2008), interference in Greenlandic affairs is a much more sensitive issue (Gad, 2008, 
2009b). 
So Greenlandic and Danish self-images overlap enough to allow the continuation of the 
relationship. The basic way of legitimizing constitutional and economic dependency on both sides 
of the Atlantic Ocean is an agreement that Greenland needs help to develop towards self-sustenance 
and self-government (Gad, 2008, 2009b). The flip side of this is that the continuation of this 
narrative of the raison d'être of the community is endangered whenever it is implied that Greenland 
will never be capable of independence – or that Denmark has other motives than assisting 
Greenland on its way to this goal. To keep up appearances, both sides engage in games that are 
ultimately made possible – but also made necessary – by the either/or concept of sovereignty. In 
other words, to allow the continuation of the constitutional link, sovereignty has been articulated in 
creative ways on both sides of the Atlantic. The remaining part of this section demonstrates how 
Danish concerns with protecting its sovereignty over Greenland have framed the games played in 
the Greenland‒Denmark relationship. Lately, some of these games have involved the EU as the 
third party. 
Denmark playing games to protect its sovereignty 
In 1749, Danish King Christian VII granted monopoly on trade with Greenland to the precursor of 
the Royal Greenlandic Trade Company. The context of the trade monopoly was, of course, 
competition. Specifically, Dutch and Basque whalers traded with the Inuit (Gad, 1973: 187 et 
passim; Marquardt 2006: 146‒7, 153‒4). Hence, Denmark engaged in what may count as a core 
colonial sovereignty game; employing sovereignty to protect the extraction of resources. The final 
9 
round of the traditional version of this game was played in the early decades of the twentieth 
century, when Norwegian hunters foraged remote parts of east Greenland, later claimed by Norway. 
To bolster Danish sovereignty, a small group of Inuit was moved a few hundred kilometres up the 
east coast to Scoresby Sound to establish a permanent presence at Ittoqqortoormiit. Norway 
ultimately lost out at the International Court in the Hague in 1933 (Sørensen, 2006: 54). In a parallel 
move, Danish‒Greenlandic explorer Knud Rasmussen personally established the Thule trade post in 
the far North West Greenland in 1910, i.a. with a view to pre-empt competing US and Norwegian 
claims to the territory (Müntzberg and Simonsen, 1996; cf. Lidegaard, 2003: 177‒83). 
During and after the Second World War, Denmark found itself in two different sovereignty games; 
a geostrategic game and the game of global decolonization. First, as Germany occupied Denmark, 
the Danish ambassador to Washington and Danish governors of Greenland ‘upheld’ Danish 
sovereignty over Greenland by letting the US protect the island (Lidegaard, 1999: 179‒88, 334‒5). 
This involved the construction of huge air force bases – operations which effectively annulled the 
Danish policy of keeping Greenland sealed to protect the Greenlanders (Sørensen, 2006: 62‒95). 
With the connections to Copenhagen re-established in 1945, the US – after having considered 
buying the island – formally recognized Danish sovereignty in the 1951 Defence Agreement in 
return for being granted substantially free hands in utilizing Greenlandic territory for defence 
purposes (Lidegaard, 1999: 179‒88, 334‒5, 407). Essentially, then, Denmark maintained formal 
sovereignty over Greenland by emptying the concept of any content, at least when it comes to 
military affairs. At the same time, the decolonization process was institutionalized in the UN. The 
1953 integration of Greenland as a formally equal part of Denmark kept the UN from supervising 
decolonization in this case (Alfredsson, 2004). By awarding the Greenlanders a formally equal 
share in Danish sovereignty over their island, international authority was kept from interfering in 
the game on behalf of a potentially independent Greenlandic sovereignty. 
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The Danish moves in these three sovereignty games – resource extraction, geostrategy and 
decolonization – conspired to produce one of the most contested episodes in Greenlandic colonial 
history. Since the establishment of the Thule trade station – later taken over by the Danish state – 
the local Inuit (called Inughuit) had largely settled to form a town. This settlement was increasingly 
getting in the way of the expanding US Air Base at Thule. In the very last months before the 1953 
Danish constitution would award civil rights to Greenlanders, the Danish authorities moved the 
population from their permanent residence to form a tent village some 100 kilometres north 
(Eastern High Court, 2002: 63). In these earlier sovereignty games, Denmark combined two basic 
strategies: Sovereignty was asserted vis-à-vis the Greenlanders by forcefully producing the physical 
realities deemed expedient. Sovereignty was legitimized vis-à-vis third parties by paternalistically 
acting on behalf of the unspoiled native. Today, both strategies are difficult to pursue for reasons 
pertaining both to the past and to the future. 
First, the increasing recognition of past colonial wrongdoings has delegitimized the paternalist 
pretensions of colonialism globally. In Greenland, the results of the two population transfers 
mentioned above are constant reminders of the colonial sovereignty games that formed them. The 
tiny towns of Ittoqqortoormiit in East Greenland and Qaanaaq at Thule are currently among the 
most fragile communities in Greenland. They are among the most impoverished communities in the 
country and suffer from a wide range of deep social problems.
iii
 As part of the 2009 transfer to self-
government, Denmark formally acknowledged that Greenland has the right to secede should it wish 
to do so. And as the following will show in relation to the EU, Denmark is only able to secure 
sovereignty over Greenland by placing the self-same sovereignty not just in but at the service of 
Greenland. This is a delicate task, likely destined to fail in the long run, as it does not merely hinge 
on securing the compatibility of Greenlandic and Danish national identity discourses, it also hinges 
on which future is imagined. 
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Hence, the crucial importance of the second reason why the past Danish strategies are impossible to 
pursue: a widespread vision of the Arctic future awards Greenland better access to alternatives to 
engaging exclusively with Denmark. A new sovereignty game is currently taking shape in an Arctic 
that many observers imagine will open up to new players as the ice melts. On one dimension, this is 
a traditional horizontal sovereignty game between the five Arctic states (Russia, Canada, the US, 
Norway and Denmark), each seeking to secure the largest share of the Arctic Ocean by submitting 
geological evidence of continental continuity in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of 
the Seas (Strandsbjerg, 2011) – and with massive corporations ready to step in to extract resources 
(Refsnes, 2011). On another dimension, the either/or concept of sovereignty implied in the claims 
of the ‘Arctic 5’ is challenged both by indigenous peoples submitting claims for sovereignty, which 
structures space differently (Shadian, 2010; Gerhardt, 2011), and by environmentalists and non-
Artic states proposing further international regulation to protect the environment or allocate 
resources differently.
iv
 
In sum, in the course of the twentieth century, Denmark has engaged in games to protect its 
sovereignty over Greenland by employing practical strategies at the expense of Greenlandic 
individuals and groups – all the while rhetorical strategies were employed to persuade both 
Greenlanders and outsiders that Denmark exercised its sovereignty to benefit and protect the 
Greenlanders. Relocating groups of Greenlanders served to secure Danish sovereignty; first under 
international law in the Hague; second by allowing superpower utilization of the territory formally 
secured. Historical shifts in which sovereignty games are deemed legitimate at the global level, 
however, have made the continuation of such strategies self-defeating: while constitutional 
incorporation in 1953 initially served to defer self-government by dodging the global decolonization 
process, the wrongs committed under and to protect colonial sovereignty nevertheless delegitimized 
Danish sovereignty over Greenland in a decolonized context to the point where formal Greenlandic 
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sovereignty is merely a matter of Greenland formally claiming it. Meanwhile, the substantial 
resources deemed necessary for Greenlandic sovereignty to be more than an empty shell appear to 
be materializing as the Arctic ice continues to melt – not just because the climate becomes less 
prohibitive for the extraction of Greenlandic minerals but also because the accompanying interest 
from new business partners and rising powers conveys the impression that Greenland has 
alternatives to Denmark. 
Greenland playing games to enhance subjectivity 
Greenland utilizes this new game – opened up by improved prospects for being able to harvest 
resources in the Arctic – to empower itself in its relations to the EU. This relationship is itself the 
result of an intersection of different sovereignty games: from its very conception, the European 
treaties included special provisions for those of the member state’s colonies that did not seek 
independent sovereignty, opting instead to remain ‘overseas countries and territories’ (OCTs) (Gad 
and Adler-Nissen, 2012). When Denmark became engaged in the late sovereignty games of 
European integration (cf. the introduction to this issue), these provisions came in handy.  
Until recently, Greenland was the only EC territory to ever cede membership status.
v
 When 
Denmark became a member of the EC in 1973, Greenland also had to join despite a 70% majority 
against doing so (Petersen, 2006). Since the 1953 constitution, Greenland had been considered a 
part of Denmark – and unlike the Faroe Islands it did not have a home rule arrangement to provide 
for a separate path: the Faroes stayed out of the EU along with other Nordic fisheries nations 
(Iceland and Norway). The 1972 referendum campaign in Greenland was also focused on fisheries. 
The decisive argument boiled down to a claim that 'Now, Copenhagen decides who may catch our 
fish – in the future, the decisions will be taken even further away; in Brussels’ (Skydsbjerg, 1999: 
25). To allow for more – not less – subjectivity, new legal arrangements were called for: The urge 
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to leave the EC was so strong that it was decisive in the struggle for home rule (cf. Lauritzen, 
1997[1973]: 15‒21).  
Greenlandic home rule was established in 1979 and Greenland was moved to the OCT arrangement 
after complex negotiations on the unprecedented request to leave the EC.
vi
 The package deal 
negotiated included a fisheries agreement which traded EC access to Greenlandic waters for tax free 
access for Greenlandic fisheries products to the European Single Market and a lump sum which 
matched the previous transfers to Greenland from the social and structural funds (Skydsbjerg, 1999: 
26).
vii
  
Copenhagen had left its fisheries policy to Brussels as part of the European sovereignty game in 
which sovereignty is distributed not just territorially but also – and increasingly – functionally (cf. 
the introduction to this special issue). The Greenlanders had already ‘taken home’ from 
Copenhagen
viii
 the fisheries policy as a home rule issue. The bottom line is that since leaving the EU 
in 1985, Nuuk has had de facto sovereignty over fisheries; a sovereignty used to trade fish for cash. 
But the cash stream soon appeared fragile and sovereignty did not in itself secure cultural identity. 
First, some of the fish sold were ‘paper fish’, which the Commission had originally invented so that 
they could be redistributed in the on-going haggling over quotas.
ix
 During the 1990s, the EU 
realized that the money spent on Greenlandic paper fish could be spent better on real fish along the 
coastlines of African states. In 2006, however, a new special partnership agreement foreseeing 
increased cooperation in a number of areas presumably of interest to the EU – including minerals, 
transportation and climate research – legitimized a budget line allowing the funding of Greenlandic 
sustainable development of human resources through education, even though Greenland is more 
affluent than the EU average, let alone the countries covered by the EU development programmes. 
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Second and less immediately reparable, formal sovereignty did not immediately secure cultural 
identity: On the one hand, Greenlandic identity discourse involves development towards self-
sufficiency under the conditions of a globalizing world economy. This has implied a centralization 
of deep sea fishing on very few boats, controlled by very few people. On the other hand, 
Greenlandic identity discourse involves care for a traditional culture – which is implied to require a 
distribution of the population in small settlements along the coastline, depending for their livelihood 
on small-scale fishing and hunting. On top of the concentration of the fisheries, Western animal 
rights groups have attacked a series of indigenous hunting practices (whaling, sealing and trapping) 
which carry weight as they pertain to icons of Inuit culture. In a series of these cases, Greenland has 
tried to influence the EU to either change EU regulations threatening Greenlandic interests or to 
gain European support in preventing international regulations or challenging, i.a., US regulations. In 
these cases, Greenland has variously attempted to limit and influence Danish and EU sovereignty 
and attempted to employ Danish and EU sovereignty further abroad. 
As the then Prime Minister of Greenland explained, in contrast to the Faroes, Greenland has 
consciously chosen to ‘use the Danish platform’ when dealing with the EU.x The choice of 
metaphor is interesting: a platform is something you stand on to reach things you would otherwise 
not be able to reach. In terms of the metaphor, then, the Greenlanders are the active part doing their 
own thing, while the Danish platform is passive. As seen in the next section, this is very much in 
line with how Greenland likes to present itself in Brussels and how Greenlandic politicians like to 
present affairs at home. As the proceeding section lays out, things are slightly more complicated in 
the practical games played in Brussels.  
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Greenlandic visions of sovereign equality 
As demonstrated above, the fear of letting sovereignty over fisheries – as well as power over the 
future development of Greenland in general – go south to Brussels was decisive when Greenland 
voted against the EU in referenda in 1972 and 1982. The self-image of Greenland as a nation on its 
way to self-government made EU sovereignty over fisheries unbearable. Among the proponents of 
EU membership, however, the development of Greenland towards economic self-sufficiency was at 
the top of the agenda – more specifically; the contributions of the EU to the Greenlandic budget and 
to development projects in Greenland.  
The last general debate in the Greenlandic parliament on the EU took place in 2007.
xi
 Also this 
debate played out around these two concerns: self-government and self-sufficiency – even as 
proponents of EU membership limited their demands to asking for an investigation into alternatives 
to the present arrangements,
xii
 which – as laid out above – amounts to OCT status supplemented by 
fishery and partnership agreements.  
As for the pecuniary question, the membership proponents claimed that 
membership of the EU ... will be able to accelerate the process towards an 
independent Greenland ... It will be possible to introduce independence without a drop 
in the standard of living or the level of service, as Greenland will be able to obtain 
more funds from the EU than is the case today.
xiii
 
The minister rebuffs by reminding of the relative affluence of Greenland: 
 [C]oncerning structural funds and social funds [it ... sounds] like the purse is just 
open ... this is hardly correct. First, one has to apply ... then one gets a share 
depending on the needs of the member states ... Greenland [would be] number 10 or 
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11 [if inserted into the list of 27 EU member states] when it comes to the GDP pr. 
capita ... so [we] should ... not imagine that the purse is just open.
xiv
 
When it comes to the question of influence, the proponents of membership seek recourse in a trope 
well-known from Danish debates on EU membership (especially when the Danish opt outs from the 
Euro, Justice and Home Affairs, etc., are discussed): 
[W]e will – so to speak – have a seat at the table. This will increase our possibilities 
for exercising influence on issues important to our country ... The influence of the EU 
on legislation and regulation in Denmark as well as in Greenland is already – whether 
we want to admit it or not – rather great, and therefore ... we might as well try to be 
part of influencing the decision-making process as much as possible. This we may 
only do via membership.
xv
 
In this case, the minister’s reply begins by reminding on whose lap Greenland will have to sit to be 
at the table: 
In the present constitutional situation, EU membership will only be possible as a part 
of  Denmark ... Greenland will not directly and automatically be guaranteed 
participation in meetings  where questions of interest for Greenland are dealt with. In 
every single case, participation will have to  follow an agreement with the Danish 
government and have to take place as part of a Danish delegation.
xvi
 
Interestingly, this future-to-be-avoided (because it allows a disturbingly prominent role to 
Denmark) is contrasted to a present in which Denmark does not stand between Greenland and the 
EU: 
[T]he prescriptions for mutual dialogue in existing agreements [i.e. OCT, fisheries and 
partnership] are better at securing Greenlandic interests at direct meetings between the 
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Commission and Greenland ... [Now, w]e can have a direct dialogue with the EU, and 
if we become members, then we will have to be dragged around by Denmark inside 
the EU.
xvii
 
So when explaining the benefits of the present relationship with the EU to a domestic audience, 
Denmark tends to disappear: Greenland and the EU have a direct – and in that sense equal – 
relationship.
xviii
 In this way, a Greenland of the future is presented to its own people: a Greenland 
which has broken with the colonial dependency of the past and is already taking care of its own 
international relations. A Greenland which, for all practical purposes, enjoys sovereign equality in 
relation to the EU. By articulating the concept of sovereignty creatively, the government of 
Greenland may present a Greenland to its own citizens which is more attractive in the terms of 
Greenlandic identity discourse than the one formal legal analysis would suggest. 
When communicating with the EU, Greenland also envisions sovereign equality by photo-shopping 
Denmark out of the picture. First, when writing about the future of the relationship at the most 
abstract level, Greenland avails itself of the discourse about a future Arctic bonanza to describe 
itself as commanding unique resources, which it may choose to offer either to the EU or another 
party, depending on how forthcoming the partners show themselves to be in relation to Greenland’s 
need for both cash flow and recognition of the symbolically important cultural practices involving 
the killing of wild animals. Most strikingly, Denmark is not even mentioned in the descriptions of 
this future. Consequently, Greenland presents itself as an independent subject capable of engaging 
in a traditional zero-sum sovereignty game with the EU.
xix
 Second, when handling the relationship 
to the EU in day-to-day diplomacy, Greenlandic officials have since the first posting in 1992 of a 
Greenlandic representative at the Danish Representation in Brussels prioritized an independent 
visual presence. Today, the Greenland Representation has four full-time employees – and visitors 
no longer have to pass Danish flags to talk to them; a separate entrance flanked by Greenlandic 
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insignia has been established. Parallel games are played in official meetings and texts relating 
Greenland to the EU – games which need not only acceptance from Denmark but also acceptance 
from the EU.
xx
 Independent visibility seems to have paid off. Greenlandic officials stress that it is 
now easier to get to business in Brussels when needed than it was a decade ago
xxi
 – simply because 
there is a higher degree of awareness that Greenland exists.
xxii
 
Both in Brussels and at home, the government of Greenland lets Denmark out of the picture when 
portraying the relationship to the EU. Sovereignty – formally residing in Copenhagen – is, hence, 
creatively articulated with a view to enhancing Greenlandic subjectivity. Greenland has not claimed 
sovereignty – but it mimes sovereignty and may thereby achieve something else (Gad and Adler-
Nissen, 2012): legitimacy from its own citizens, attention from the EU, and potentially commitment 
to further engagement from both domestic and foreign audiences. 
Handling the relation in diplomatic practice
xxiii
 
As mentioned earlier, a then Prime Minister of Greenland described Denmark in terms of a mere 
‘platform’ for Greenland’s relationship to the EU – and when the government of Greenland 
describes its relationship to the EU in both their parliament and in Brussels, Denmark is routinely 
photo-shopped out of the picture. The practical games played in Brussels seem, however, to imply a 
distribution of agency which is more complex than the platform metaphor and the photo-shopping 
would allow.  
Most of those interviewed find that persons matter in a small-scale diplomatic corps.
xxiv
 From this 
point of view, it might prove significant that a generational change has taken place in how 
Greenland‒EU relations are handled. Since the branching off of Greenland‒EU relations from 
Danish‒EU relations in the mid-1980s, they have basically been handled by the same trio: first, 
Greenland’s representative in Brussels; second, the head of the Greenlandic representation in 
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Copenhagen, who doubles as the chief negotiator of Greenland’s international fisheries agreements. 
Both were Danes with personal ties to Greenland, who began their carriers in the Danish colonial 
administration but were ‘taken home’ by the home rule government after it was established in 1979. 
The third member of the trio was the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs' old hand on Greenland’s 
EU relations. The fact that the members of the trio retired between 2007 and 2011 not only brought 
an end to a continuity which was rather unique for both the Greenlandic bureaucracy and for the 
Danish MFA; their retirement also allowed a ‘Greenlandization’ and possibly signals a Danish 
detachment. 
A basic benefit of continuity was, of course, first-hand experience with previous rounds of 
negotiations with the EU. The continuity of the Greenland‒EU portfolio in the Danish MFA also 
secured that at least one person in Denmark might be granting qualified attention to EU issues that 
might be relevant for Greenland in a way which does not conform to regular Danish priorities.
xxv
 
This concern was why the Government of Greenland requested the continuity.
xxvi
 The flipside of 
this continuity, however, was that Greenlanders ultimately worried that the Danish MFA might find 
that loyalty shifted from Copenhagen to Nuuk, endangering the point of the whole setup.
xxvii
 
In more subtle ways, the continuity of portfolios – and the continuity of personal experience and 
contacts across the fine line between Danish and Greenlandic bureaucracy – provided advantages to 
the home rule government in negotiations. When comparing his conditions to those of his Icelandic 
colleagues, one Greenlandic official notes that inside knowledge of the EU’s internal coordination 
procedures has made a significant difference – not only in terms of the elegance with which the 
negotiations could be conducted but also in terms of the results. The inside knowledge came both 
from personal experience from earlier assignments within what was then the Danish Ministry for 
Greenland – but also from relating to sympathetic Danish colleagues sitting on the European side of 
the table representing Denmark as a member state in the internal EU coordination.
xxviii
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Moreover, continuity allowed the trio to develop a distinct distribution of roles. Of particular 
interest are the postcolonial blame games occasionally played by one Greenlandic official in 
particular. They involved literally kicking doors open to get access and slamming them shut behind 
him when leaving meetings in anger.
xxix
 These games also involved ‘publically’ criticizing the 
Danish official present at a meeting with European counterparts for acting in a ‘colonialist’ 
manner.
xxx
  
Overall, it is difficult not to find the outcome of the games successful when considering the core 
priorities of Greenland: to keep both the cash flow from Brussels and self-government in fisheries 
intact. When asked to explain the success, however, interviewees place the decisive agency 
differently: while some insist that the result came about because the assets which Greenland 
commands (fish) were simply necessary for the EU to acquire,
xxxi
 others ascribe the success to the 
elaborate and broad-spectre preparatory efforts coordinated between Greenland and Denmark, 
including the combination of ministerial tourism, writing the self-interest of the EU and 
documenting Greenland’s needs and potentials in detail.xxxii Others yet insist that what made the EU 
agree was a high-level conversation in which the President of the European Commission asked the 
Danish Prime Minister whether ‘the member state really meant’ the demands put forward by the 
Greenlanders.
xxxiii
 More interesting than the question of which story might be the best 
approximation to reality is to note how the three narratives match three different political stances to 
the present and future of the Community of the Realm hinted at above: An unnecessary straitjacket 
for a Greenland ready to secede; a handy working relationship until Greenland is ready; and the 
framework for maternalistic Danish benevolence necessary to endure, as Greenland is too small to 
ever handle independence. 
In the cases where Inuit traditions of killing wild animals have been under attack, there is no doubt 
that Danish support – especially in the Council of Ministers – has been central to any success with 
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influencing the EU. But Danish support has been neither unlimited nor automatic, as the Danish 
position is to be formulated as a compromise between, on the one hand, North Atlantic priorities 
and, on the other, Danish public opinion and consistency with the more conservationist position 
Denmark advocates in comparative cases outside the Community of the Realm.
xxxiv
 A recent case 
provides a vivid example of the importance attached to the issue – and of the difficulties it entails: 
in 2009, the EU prepared a ban on the import of sealskin. In a letter to, i.a., the presidents of the 
European Commission and the European Parliament, the speaker of the Greenlandic parliament 
warned that Europe was repeating the colonial policies pursued in South America 400 years ago and 
thereby committing ‘cultural genocide’ (Motzfeldt in KNR, 2009; cf. ICC, 2009). Behind the fears 
of the collapsing market was the threat to cultural practices described as essential to Inuit identity 
(Fægteborg, 1990; Gad, 2005: ch.2) posed by Western standards of ‘humane’ treatment of 
animals.
xxxv
 Concerted and persistent Danish‒Greenlandic action secured that the recent ban on the 
import of sealskin exempts skin produced by traditional hunters. This exemption did not, however, 
ameliorate the fears of the government of Greenland that sealskin would be impossible to sell in 
Europe for all practical purposes (GoG, 2009). The Greenlandic government considered at one 
point asking Denmark to act on its behalf in the WTO to challenge the ban on the import of sealskin 
introduced in the EU (including Denmark).
xxxvi
 One Greenlandic official mentioned this case as one 
in which the constitutional link to Denmark – and Denmark’s lack of good will on a specific point – 
has been a barrier to pursuing Greenlandic interests: under conditions of formal sovereignty, 
Greenland would have been free to follow Canada on this.
xxxvii
 
The generational change in the handling of Greenland’s EU relations has meant that they are now 
entirely in the hands of bureaucrats and diplomats without personal memory of Denmark’s handling 
of pre-Home Rule Greenland as part of the EC. This has meant a ‘Greenlandization’ of the handling 
which is described as ‘only natural’.xxxviii The Greenlandic representatives in Brussels and 
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Copenhagen along with the chief fisheries negotiator (now based in Nuuk) and the Greenland‒EU 
desk officer in the Danish MFA are now all Greenlanders ‒ products of Danish and international 
higher education but with the Home Rule administration as their central job experience. Apart from 
this Greenlandization, however, the generational change also seems to involve a sense of Danish 
detachment: the Greenland‒EU file in the MFA has been merged with the general Greenland file 
and allocated to a Greenlander temporally employed rather than to a career diplomat. Meanwhile a 
separate position as 'Arctic Ambassador' has been formed and filled with MFA seniors with no 
particular Greenlandic experience. The Greenland file at the Danish permanent representation in 
Brussels is now a side task for younger diplomats rotating in and out of town every few years.
xxxix
 
The bulk of the workload and the initiative in handling the day-to-day business of Greenland vis-à-
vis the EU would gradually seem to have shifted from the Danish to the Greenlandic side.
xl
 Asked 
about the possible consequences of the generational change for the – more heavy-duty – 
negotiations of Greenland’s partnership and fisheries agreements with the EU, one central 
Greenlandic official finds that losing the memory of alternatives left behind ‘may, after all, be both 
bad and good’.xli 
Conclusion: the place of Denmark – already in the past 
Greenland’s relationship with the EU combines two elements: First, Greenland uses the Danish 
membership as a ‘platform’ from which to handle its EU relations. Second, Greenland sports a 
national identity narrative which projects a sovereign Greenlandic nation state imagined by 
simultaneously mirroring and liberating itself from the Danish nation state. The combination of an 
urge to realize a sovereign nation state which is distinctively post-Danish in its insistence on the 
coincidence of state and nation with a practical dependence on Danish sovereign diplomacy has 
necessitated that games are played with present Danish sovereignty in both the practical handling 
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and the discursive presentation of the relations to the EU. Particularly, in a number of instances, 
Denmark is photo-shopped out of the picture in both rhetoric and practice, at home and abroad: 
Greenland speaks and acts as if the relationship to Denmark was already a thing of the past. This 
arrangement, notably, is also convenient for Denmark: by ‘allowing’ Greenland to act 
independently, Denmark may escape the embarrassment of the ‘colonialist’ label. In a number of 
instances, however, one might foresee the breakdown of some of the games if they come to interfere 
with each other in specific ways: 
First, while the former colonizer is photo-shopped out of the picture in certain instances, the 
practical handling of the relationship relies on Denmark in a way which goes beyond what may 
meaningfully be described as a platform. Perhaps the coming of age of a new generation of 
Greenlandic civil servants, working under a political leadership more determinedly committed to 
Greenlandic independence, will find an increased urge – or need – to make Denmark even less 
active.  
Second, in the rhetorical construction of narratives of the relationship, politicians may find 
themselves in a crossfire: describing the present relationship to the EU as one of sovereign equality 
may score points at home, but overplaying the present independence may be risky when talking to a 
Commission anxious not to interfere in the constitutional relations between its member states and 
their overseas countries and territories.
xlii
 Describing the future relationship as one of sovereign 
equality may score points both at home and in Brussels – but it makes Greenland dependent; first, 
on a geopolitical discourse which may not turn out to be beneficial to a microstate; and second, on a 
discourse on future resources and opportunities in the Arctic which may or may not materialize. If 
not overplayed, however, the two narratives may actually sum up to a credible strategy, allowing 
Greenland to drag itself up by its bootstraps: if – by telling the Greenlanders that they are taking 
care of their own relations with the EU themselves in virtual sovereign equality – they provoke the 
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very civic engagement and energy needed for Greenland to actually fend for itself, then sovereign 
equality is a good step closer. If – by telling the EU that Greenlandic resources are necessary and 
valuable – they stimulate the investments necessary to indeed realize the potential resources; then 
formal sovereignty is a good step closer; provided that the resources – human and natural – show up 
when envisioned into being. A sovereignty which will be distinctively post-Danish in how it is 
modelled on a Danish ideal which stipulates that sovereignty ultimately belongs to a culturally 
homogenous people. 
The way the Greenlandic government has engaged in sovereignty games in its relations with the EU 
shows that a non-sovereign polity can enhance its own subjectivity in relation to third parties. 
Greenland’s strategy has a double effect: it has made the acquisition of full formal sovereignty more 
plausible while at the same time widening the room to manoeuvre within (post-)imperial 
sovereignty. Notably, this has been achieved by refraining from a general confrontation (rhetorical 
or otherwise) with Denmark. Rather, confrontations with the colonial overlords have been carefully 
calculated and occasionally staged to achieve maximum concessions from the EU. These 
calculations and theatrics have, of course, relied on a particular constellation of past and future: the 
undeniable history of imperial subjugation combined with the enticing projection of an Arctic 
bonanza ahead. Hence, Greenland may credibly present itself as both a victim of past Danish 
sovereignty games and an important player in future Arctic sovereignty games in ways which are 
not open to other micropolities in Norden or overseas. 
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i
 Greenlanders play an active part in the global movement of indigenous peoples concentrating on the United Nations 
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues. This forum is an important arena for sovereignty games in which colonized 
peoples seek to challenge both the individual states and the system of sovereign states by appropriating and ‘stretching’ 
the language and tools of the selfsame states (Lindroth, 2011). Specifically, the Government of Greenland is represented 
in the UNPF as part of the Danish delegation, while the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC) is part of the caucus of 
indigenous NGOs, even if the Greenlandic chapter of ICC is mainly funded by the Parliament of Greenland. Only in 
relation to the right to kill wild animals, however, does the Greenlandic government bring the language and practices of 
the indigenous movement to the sovereignty games played in relation to the EU. In the general relations and in relation 
to other specific issue areas, Greenland presents itself as a state in the making rather than as an indigenous people. 
ii
 The Greenlandic term for ‘community of the realm’, naalagaaffeqatigiinneq, literaly translates into a relationship 
which is even more explicitly equal than the Danish version: naalagaq means the one who decides – in this case, what 
is done is qatigiinneq; something which is done together with someone (else) (Lennert, 2006: 1, n.2; Gad, 2008: 122). 
The Faroes are part of the same community – but that plays no significant role in the debates Greenland nor Denmark: 
The community of the realm is basically discussed as two bilateral relations (Denmark‒Greenland and 
Denmark‒Faroes). Critics insist that, in legal terms, the ‘community’ part of the label is void, as what the label covers 
are unilateral delegations from the Danish Parliament (Høydal, 2000), even if some legal scholars doubt that the 
delegations may be withdrawn (Harhoff, 2003). 
iii
 The official recruitment material for the Greenlandic medical service organization says that ‘Ittoqqortoormiit is not a 
place to flee to solve one’s owns problems. Ittoqqortoormiit is a place to go to if you have energy to share’ (Bendtsen 
(ed.) 2012: 55; trl. by the author). Concerning Qaanaaq, cf. the social and medical statistics in Bjerregaard and Dahl-
Petersen (2011). 
iv
 In this game, Denmark’s strategy has been to promote the Arctic Council as the relevant body of governance and 
thereby escape the ‘realist’ version of sovereignty-as-either/or (determined by the raw power to protect sovereignty). 
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